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THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE 
OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IS 
NOT DEAD 
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
Abstract
In 1895, the New York Court of Appeals, in refusing to enforce a Kansas 
statute, referred to “a principle of universal application, recognized in all civ-
ilized states, that the statutes of one state have . . . no force or effect in another.” 
In 1897, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted that “[t]he statute of another 
state has, of course, no extraterritorial force.”  That old notion describes the 
extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause.  In recent years, 
the doctrine has become problematic for several reasons.  One, the line between 
intrastate and interstate business has become blurred with many fewer trans-
actions falling clearly in the former category.  Two, when Congress does not 
act on issues that affect many, if not all, states, it creates the impression that 
federalism is not working and states need to undertake a larger role in regulat-
ing commerce.  Three, there is a clear two-part test for the out-of-state-discrim-
ination strand of the dormant Commerce Clause, so it is easy to confuse it with 
an appropriate test for the extraterritoriality doctrine.  Therefore, some com-
mentators have said that the extraterritoriality doctrine serves no useful pur-
pose.  This article argues that there is a reasonably clear test for extraterrito-
riality, and the doctrine serves the important purposes of discouraging undue 
burdens on interstate commerce and of not giving preference to one state’s pol-
icy decisions over the decisions of other states. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution explicitly gives a power to 
the U.S. Congress and implicitly limits states’ powers.  The purpose of the 
Clause in its entirety is to promote a national economy, and its parts contribute 
to that purpose in several different ways.  The least understood of the parts is 
the extraterritoriality doctrine of the negative implication of the Clause that lim-
its the way states can regulate. 
The extraterritoriality doctrine has been an issue in important recent cases 
and, as a result, has also been the subject of recent articles, some of which call 
for its elimination or pronounce it already dead.  This article demonstrates that 
the doctrine still serves well the dual purposes of promoting interstate com-
merce and discouraging hostility among states while each carries out its own 
policies in its own best interest. 
The first part of the article gives a brief description of the negative implica-
tion of the Commerce Clause.  Then there is an explanation of the extraterrito-
riality doctrine of the Commerce Clause and a review of cases in which courts 
applied it.  The following two sections explain the dormant Commerce Clause’s 
relationship to alcoholic beverage regulation, focusing on the State of New 
York’s strange extraterritorial regulation of a retail New York wine business. 
Next are some examples of state common law references to extraterritoriality.
Finally, there is a summary of the opposition to the extraterritoriality doctrine. 
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The article concludes that courts have adequately defined a test for extraterri-
toriality, which serves to invalidate states’ attempts at regulating beyond their 
borders; thus, discouraging burdens on interstate commerce and encouraging 
states to refrain from imposing their own policies and regulations on other states 
that may have different legitimate ideas about the best way to govern. 
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States.”1  The U.S. Supreme Court has said that in 
addition to creating this federal power to regulate interstate commerce, the 
Commerce Clause has negative implications to the so-called dormant Com-
merce Clause.2  The purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to establish a 
free market across the entire nation by restricting states and localities from im-
peding the free flow of goods across state lines.3  “[L]ocal needs” should not 
restrict “the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce.”4
In a recent Commerce Clause case, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, 
noted that “a central concern of the Framers . . . was . . . to avoid the tendencies 
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colo-
nies.”5  Justice Alito continued that “[a]lthough the Clause is framed as a posi-
tive grant of power to Congress, ‘we have consistently held this language to 
contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, 
prohibiting certain state [regulation] even when Congress has failed to legislate 
on the subject.’”6
In spite of the Supreme Court’s recognition for almost two hundred years 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
2. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (Com-
merce “Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the power 
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce”); Healy v. 
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989) (“This Court long has recognized that this affirmative grant 
of authority to Congress also encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on the authority of the 
States to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.”). 
For an historical analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause see Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of 
States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Fed-
eralism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 471–75 (2003). 
3. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469–70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 
329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)). 
5. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015) (quoting Hughes v. Ok-
lahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)). 
6. Id. (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)). 
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that the Commerce Clause has implications for states,7 the dormant Commerce 
Clause still remains a controversial subject.8  In 2015, the late Justice Scalia 
called it “a judge-invented rule” that is “a judicial fraud.”9  Nevertheless, Court 
jurisprudence has created a basic two-tiered method for deciding whether state 
regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause.10  “A discriminatory [state] 
law is ‘virtually per se invalid,’ and will survive only if it ‘advances a legitimate 
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives.’”11  If a state law is not discriminatory on its face, “[t]he de-
cisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law [in 
accomplishing the legitimate state purpose] is so slight or problematical as not 
to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from in-
terferences which seriously impede it.”12  The resulting judicial exercise is 
known as the Pike balancing test.13  Since the balancing test was named in 1970, 
it has been referred to in eighty-two federal appellate court cases and in all fed-
eral circuit courts first through eleventh.14
Although, “[m]odern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence primarily 
‘is driven by concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-
state competitors,”’”15 dormant Commerce Clause interpretation also includes 
the notion of extraterritoriality which has been described as “the least under-
7. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 75–77 (1824). 
8. See, e.g., Comptroller, 135 S. Ct. at 1807–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609–20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254–65 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
9. Comptroller, 135 S. Ct. at 1807–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986).
11. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)); City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
12. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 775–76. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (holding North Carolina statute discriminated against Washington apples and 
burdened interstate sales of Washington apples). 
13. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2015);
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Cty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2014); Heffner 
v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 73–74 (3d Cir. 2014).
15. Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 399 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dep’t of
Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 
486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988))). 
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stood of the Court’s three strands of dormant commerce clause jurispru-
dence.”16  The extraterritorial doctrine applies when a state regulates conduct 
that is wholly outside its own borders and, under the doctrine, unconstitution-
ality does not depend on the regulation’s discriminating against out-of-staters.17
One articulated reason for the doctrine is that if more than one state were to 
regulate extraterritorially in the same sphere, the result could be inconsistent 
rules and a stifling of interstate commerce.18  But the actual existence of a leg-
islative conflict is not a necessary prerequisite for the extraterritoriality doctrine 
to apply.19  It has just been long and well accepted that a state’s regulatory 
power stops at its own borders. 
In 1834, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story wrote in his Commen-
taries on the Conflict of Laws that “no state or nation can, by its laws, directly 
affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident 
therein.”20  In 1881, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Morrison Waite opined 
that “[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.”21
Justice Cardozo noted that “[i]t is the established doctrine of this [C]ourt that a 
State may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution 
of interstate business.”22
16. Epel, 793 F.3d at 1172. 
17. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (asserting three extraterritoriality 
propositions: (1) state statute may not apply to commerce wholly outside state’s borders; (2) legislative 
intent is not relevant if regulation controls commerce wholly outside state’s borders; (3) Commerce 
Clause prohibits one state projecting its regulation into another state); see also Am. Booksellers Found. 
v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Healy and asserting that Vermont’s Internet regu-
lation projects its legislation into other states, directly regulating commerce there and violating dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
18. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). 
19. Barbara O. Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State Antitrust Laws 
Banning Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 415 (2012).  One com-
mentator has actually suggested that a state’s extraterritorial regulation should be invalid only if it 
would require “the regulated party to break the law of one state in order to follow the law of another.”
Michael J. Ruttinger, Note, Is There a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?: Commerce Clause Lim-
its on State Antitrust Laws, 106 MICH. L. REV. 545, 550 (2007). 
20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 20 (1834). 
21. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). 
22. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (quoting Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 
217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910)). 
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III. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY ASPECT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE
The extraterritoriality doctrine has been applied in a wide variety of cases.  
In most of those cases, a plaintiff has argued that a state law should be struck 
down because it attempts to regulate beyond the state’s borders.  Sometimes a 
private plaintiff has been joined by the state in which he or she resides.23  In 
other extraterritoriality cases, the plaintiff is seeking to be covered by the law 
of a state with which he or she, arguably, has no connection, and it is the de-
fendant who raises the extraterritoriality claim.24  This section describes a sam-
pling of dormant Commerce Clause extraterritoriality cases, the heavily cited 
U.S. Supreme Court cases first, then recent cases.  The purpose of reviewing a 
variety of recent cases is to demonstrate that courts generally have a good idea 
of how to apply the doctrine and that the doctrine serves the constitutional pur-
pose of limiting burdens on interstate commerce even when those burdens do 
not arise from intended or unintended state economic protectionism. 
A. The Classic Extraterritoriality Cases 
There are four cases that the U.S. Supreme Court decided between 1935 
and 1989 that set the basic precedents for finding a state’s regulation unconsti-
tutionally extraterritorial: three involved price regulation25 and one involved 
securities regulation.26
1. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.27
The first of the four involved New York State’s Milk Control Act, which 
set minimum prices that milk distributors had to pay to New York milk farm-
ers.28  The Act also prohibited distributors from selling milk in New York pur-
23. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 899 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Plaintiffs 
are the State of North Dakota, the Industrial Commission of North Dakota, the Lignite Energy Council, 
Basin Electric Power Cooperative, the North American Coal Corporation, Great Northern Properties 
Limited Partnership, Missouri Basin Municipal Power Agency d/b/a Missouri River Energy Services, 
and Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.”). 
24. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Mkt. Am., Inc., 661 S.E.2d 750, 751–53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). See infra
text at note 192 for a description of the case. 
25. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 519; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 
U.S. 573, 575 (1986); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989). 
26. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627 (1982). 
27. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
28. Id. at 519. 
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chased from out-of-state producers unless the price paid was at least the mini-
mum price that had to be paid to New York producers.29  A Vermont milk pro-
ducer challenged the latter requirement, and Justice Cardozo said that “New 
York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price 
to be paid in that state for milk acquired there.”30  He asserted that “commerce 
between the states is burdened unduly when one state regulates by indirection 
the prices to be paid to producers in another.”31
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp.32
The Illinois Business Take-Over Act required a business making a takeover
offer to register the offer with the Illinois Secretary of State if ten percent of the 
takeover target’s shares were owned by shareholders in Illinois and two of the 
following conditions existed: the target had its principal office in Illinois, was 
organized under the laws of Illinois, and had at least ten percent of its capital in 
Illinois.33  The MITE Corporation made a tender offer for all shares of Chicago 
Rivet & Machine Company, a publicly held Illinois company, but MITE did 
not register with the Illinois Secretary of State.34  Instead, MITE filed an action 
to have the Illinois law declared unconstitutional for, inter alia, violating the 
Commerce Clause.35
The Court reasoned that the Illinois law would affect all of Chicago Rivet’s 
shareholders including those who lived outside of Illinois and had no connec-
tion to Illinois; in fact, it is possible that the tender offer would not affect any 
Illinois shareholders.36  Therefore, the Court concluded that the Illinois Act had 
“a sweeping extraterritorial effect.”37  The Court held that the Commerce 
Clause “precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place 
wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects 
within the State.”38  That language has become the de facto test for impermis-
sible extraterritorial regulation: “commerce that takes place wholly outside of 
the [regulating] [s]tate’s borders.”39  The Court also mentioned that attempts at 
29. Id.
30. Id. at 518, 520–21.
31. Id. at 524.
32. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33. Id. at 626–27.
34. Id. at 627–28.
35. Id. at 628.
36. Id. at 642.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 642–43.
39. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
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extraterritorial regulation “offend sister [s]tates.”40
3. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority41
New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law required alcoholic beverage
producers to file a monthly schedule of the prices at which their products would 
be sold to wholesalers in New York.42  In addition, the producers had to affirm 
that they would not sell their products for a lower price in any other state.43  The 
latter requirement meant that if a producer sold liquor in New York, once it 
filed its prices with New York State, it was bound for the month to use those 
prices in its sales in every other state.44  It could not offer distributors in other 
states special lower prices because of any marketing decision or change in cir-
cumstances. 
Brown-Foreman, a distiller that sold several different brands of liquor in 
New York and other states, challenged New York’s law as violative of the 
Commerce Clause.45  Citing Justice Cardozo in Baldwin and the Court’s opin-
ion in Edgar, the Court concluded that New York “may not ‘project its legisla-
tion into [other States] by regulating the price to be paid’ for liquor in those 
States.”46
4. Healy v. Beer Institute47
The Healy case against the State of Connecticut was very similar to Brown-
Forman in that both were about price affirmation statutes.48  The State of Con-
necticut determined that Connecticut residents frequently crossed the border 
into New York, Massachusetts, or Rhode Island to buy beer because it was 
cheaper there.49  To remedy that situation, the Connecticut Legislature enacted 
a statute requiring anyone shipping beer into Connecticut to post its prices and 
not to sell beer in any bordering state for a price lower than the price in Con-
necticut.50  Citing Baldwin, Edgar, and Brown-Forman in its opinion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reiterated its “established view that a state law that has the 
40. Id. at 643.
41. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
42. Id. at 575.
43. Id. at 576.
44. Id. at 575–76.
45. Id. at 576–78.
46. Id. at 582–83 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)).
47. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
48. Id. at 326; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 581.
49. Healy, 491 U.S. at 326.
50. Id. at 328–29.
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‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that [s]tate’s 
borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause.”51
The Court said that the extraterritoriality doctrine of the Commerce Clause 
is based on three principles: (1) A state statute may not apply to commerce 
wholly outside the state even if the commerce has effects within the state; (2) A 
state statute that regulates commerce wholly outside the state’s borders is un-
constitutional even if the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply ex-
traterritorially; and (3) A state statute must be evaluated by considering how it 
would interact with legitimate regulation in other states, and what would hap-
pen if another state or every state enacted similar laws.52
Applying the principles specifically to the Healy case, the court said that a 
state “may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of establishing ‘a 
scale of prices for use in other states.’”53  The effect of the Connecticut statute 
was to control commerce occurring wholly outside Connecticut.54
B. Energy Cases 
It is not surprising that state regulations whose purpose is to improve envi-
ronmental conditions would engender extraterritoriality allegations: such regu-
lations would often have effects across state lines and can increase costs for 
energy companies. 
The challenged statute in North Dakota v. Heydinger was Minnesota’s Next 
Generation Energy Act (NGEA), which established standards for carbon diox-
ide emissions.55  The State of North Dakota and electric power cooperatives 
alleged, inter alia, that Minnesota’s NGEA violated the extraterritoriality doc-
trine of the dormant Commerce Clause because the NGEA controlled conduct 
occurring wholly outside of Minnesota.56  The federal district court in Minne-
sota, after analyzing more than a half dozen cases, agreed with the plaintiffs.57
The court concluded that the NGEA would require out-of-state power compa-
nies to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota before doing business in other 
states, a classic extraterritoriality situation.58  Minnesota would be regulating 
51. Id. at 332–33, 333 n.9.
52. Id. at 336.
53. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)).
54. Id. at 337.
55. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 897 (D. Minn. 2014).
56. Id. at 910.
57. Id. at 910–13.
58. Id. at 916.
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economic activity that has no relationship to Minnesota.59  The court recognized 
Minnesota’s “admirable” goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but nev-
ertheless, by projecting its legislation into other states and regulating in other 
states, it violated the extraterritorial doctrine of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.60  The court noted that “if other states adopt[ed] similar legislation, it 
could lead to balkanization.”61
In contrast, in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a California energy statute in the face of 
an extraterritoriality challenge.62  The California legislature outlined the dan-
gers of global warming in California and enacted the Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006.63  Part of the Act created the Fuel Standard, which required pro-
ducers and distributors of transportation fuels to reduce their carbon intensity.64
More than a dozen plaintiffs in industries involving corn ethanol, gasoline pro-
duction, trucking, and petrochemicals alleged that the Act violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.65  After citing Baldwin, Edgar, Brown-Forman, and Healy,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Fuel Standard 
says nothing at all about ethanol produced, sold, and used out-
side California, it does not require other jurisdictions to adopt 
reciprocal standards before their ethanol can be sold in Califor-
nia, it makes no effort to ensure the price of ethanol is lower in 
California than in other states, and it imposes no civil or crim-
inal penalties on non-compliant transactions completed wholly 
out of state.66
The Fuel Standard created a system of credits and caps that merely encour-
aged the use of cleaner fuels and applied it only to fuel blenders in California.67
Because the court concluded that the Fuel Standard had only “incidental effects 
on interstate commerce,” but did not “control conduct wholly outside the state,” 
the court held that the California regulation was not “an impermissible extra-
territorial regulation.”68
59. Id.
60. Id. at 918–19.
61. Id. at 916.
62. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1078, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g
en banc denied, 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014). 
63. Id. at 1079.
64. Id. at 1080.
65. Id. at 1070, 1077.
66. Id. at 1102–03.
67. Id. at 1103.
68. Id. at 1106–07.  Older energy cases with extraterritoriality issues are discussed in Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
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A couple of years later, a similar case arose in Oregon after the state legis-
lature had enacted a law to attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order 
to improve Oregon’s economy, quality of life, and global warming.69  The law 
set fuel standards and established a system of clean fuel credits and debits, 
which applied to fuel “produced, imported, dispensed, or used in Oregon.”70
Several energy industry groups sued the state claiming that the law violated the 
extraterritoriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause.71  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Oregon concluded that because the Ninth Circuit held in Rocky
Mountain that an analogous fuel standard did “‘not control conduct wholly out-
side the state,’ and [was] not ‘an impermissible extraterritorial regulation,’ [the] 
plaintiffs’ claim fail[ed] as a matter of law.”72
C. Bottle Redemption Cases 
A bottle bill is a container deposit law requiring a refundable deposit on 
beverage containers to encourage their recycling.73  With beverage containers 
constituting forty to sixty percent of all litter in the United States, bottle bills 
were supposed to reduce litter, conserve natural resources, and reduce the 
amount of solid waste going to landfills.74  Ten states currently have bottle bills 
that require deposits of two, five, ten, or fifteen cents on containers for a wide 
variety of beverages.75
Michigan’s bottle bill required a ten-cent deposit that is refunded to con-
sumers and distributors when they return a container.76  A problem arose be-
cause people would buy beverages out of state (where no deposit was required) 
and then return the containers in Michigan to receive the ten-cent deposit.77  To 
eliminate the problem, Michigan amended its bottle bill to require, in addition 
to a “MI 10¢” mark on each redeemable container, an identifiable symbol that 
is “‘unique to the state,’ and can be ‘used only in this state and 1 or more other 
5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2014). 
69. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1274 (D. Or. 2015). 
70. Id. at 1275. 
71. Id. at 1274, 1276. 
72. Id. at 1284 (quoting Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1106–07). 
73. What Is a Bottle Bill?, BOTTLE BILL RESOURCE GUIDE, http://www.bottle-
bill.org/about/whatis.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZVF-NDPP] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
74. Id.
75. All US States, BOTTLE BILL RESOURCE GUIDE, http://www.bottlebill.org/legislation/usa/all-
statestable.htm [https://perma.cc/9KRA-ZX8E] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (states with bottle bills: Cal-
ifornia, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Vermont). 
76. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 366–67 (6th Cir. 2013). 
77. Id. at 367. 
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states that have laws substantially similar to this act.’”78
An association of non-alcoholic beverage manufacturers, marketers, dis-
tributors, and bottlers sued the Governor of Michigan claiming, inter alia, that 
the new legislation was impermissibly extraterritorial because it regulated con-
tainers sold in other states.79  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
decided that “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the ‘practical effect of the regu-
lation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.’”80  The court 
noted that an important part of the inquiry was determining what would occur 
if many other states enacted similar laws.81  The court then found that the reg-
ulation allows Michigan to dictate where beverages can be sold and requires 
other states to comply with the legislation.82  Thus, the court concluded that 
“the Michigan statute is extraterritorial in violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it impermissibly regulates interstate commerce by controlling 
conduct beyond the State of Michigan.”83
Two years later, a California state court heard a bottle redemption case that 
had similar bottle-redemption facts but a different procedural circumstance.84
California is one of the ten states with a bottle bill.85  Similar to the Michigan 
law, California’s law requires beverage containers (containing beverages such 
as beer, wine coolers, carbonated water, and soft drinks) sold in California to 
be marked “CA Redemption Value” or one of four other similar markings.86
Consumers receive a refund, usually five cents, when they return a container to 
a certified recycling center.87  The law requires recycling centers to accept only 
eligible redemptions, that is, those purchased in California.88  Two recycling 
78. Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.572a(10) (2008)).
79. Id. at 366, 368.
80. Id. at 373 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
81. Id. at 373, 376.
82. Id. at 376.
83. Id.  Four years before the Michigan case, the United District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that it had properly enjoined the State of New York from enforcing a provision of 
the New York Returnable Container Act (bottle bill) that required a New-York-specific product code 
for beverages to be sold exclusively in New York to prevent the redemption of containers purchased 
in other states. Int’l Bottled Water Ass’n v. Paterson, No. 09 Civ. 4672(DAB), 2009 WL 2482137, at 
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009).  The court held that “the plaintiffs not only have a likelihood of suc-
cess, they are sure of success as a matter of . . . law on the question of whether the New York-exclusive 
provisions of the Bottle Bill violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.”  Id. at *2. 
84. Alamo Recycling, LLC v. Anheuser Busch InBev Wordwide, Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 983,
988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
85. Id. at 988–89.
86. Id. at 988.
87. Id. at 989.
88. Id. at 989, 991.
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companies brought the suit against a group of beverage manufacturers, includ-
ing Anheuser Busch, Coca Cola, Pepsi Cola, and Snapple, claiming that the 
defendants knowingly sold  “CA Redemption Value” beverages outside Cali-
fornia and that when those beverage containers were redeemed in California it 
subjected the recyclers to fines, penalties, criminal convictions, and revocation 
of their certification under the California law.89
Unlike the Michigan case, the California case was not about the constitu-
tionality of the California container statute.90  The plaintiffs wanted the court to 
enjoin the defendants from putting the “CA Redemption Value” or a similar 
mark on beverages that they sold outside of California and to pay damages to 
the recyclers for the expenses they had because of the out-of-California sales.91
The California appellate court, citing Edgar, Brown-Forman, Healy, and 
Snyder, reiterated the applicable impermissibly-extraterritorial test: if a state 
law directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the state’s borders, it 
is invalid.92  Because the constitutionality of the California statute was not at 
issue here, the court concluded that “[t]here is no practical difference between 
the extraterritorial consequences of a state statute, and a court’s issuance of an 
injunction or a damages award, because an injunction or damages award judg-
ment may impermissibly burden interstate commerce as much as a state stat-
ute.”93  The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court for the propositions that the test 
is whether state power is being exercised, not by the form which it takes, and 
the form can be by a judge’s or jury’s application of a state statute as well as by 
the statute itself.94  Thus, the court held that prohibiting the beverage producers 
from putting the “CA Redemption Value” mark on containers outside of Cali-
fornia would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.95
D. Subprime Loan Cases 
A comparison of two recent cases about state regulation of subprime loans 
provides a good example of the efficacy of the directly-controlling-commerce-
wholly-outside-the-state’s-borders test. There are a variety of subprime loan 
types, but they all involve a rate of return that is higher than that charged by 
traditional commercial lenders because the borrowers are individuals who do 
89. Id. at 987, 987 n.1, 992.
90. Id. at 997.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 996, 998.
93. Id. at 997.
94. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996) and San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). 
95. Id. at 997–98.
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not qualify for prime loans.96  One of the cases involves car-title loans, and the 
other is about payday loans.97  Borrowers getting car-title loans usually borrow 
a few hundred up to a few thousand dollars for thirty days, giving lenders their 
titles and a set of duplicate keys as security.98  Borrowers pay a fee up front for 
an above-100% interest rate, and if they cannot pay when the loan comes due, 
they are charged another fee plus interest.99  If borrowers cannot pay the fees 
and interest, they lose their cars.100  In a typical payday loan arrangement, the 
borrower gives the lender a post-dated check for the amount of the loan princi-
pal plus the finance charge, and the lender gives the borrower a loan in cash 
with repayment due at the borrower’s next payday, usually two weeks.101  If the 
borrower does not pay the principal and finance charge at the end of the loan 
period, the lender cashes the check.102  With a great deal of room for abuse in 
subprime loan transactions, it is not surprising that states legislate to try to pro-
tect their citizens. 
In a 2010 case, an Illinois car-title lender complained that Indiana’s Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code deemed a loan as occurring in Indiana “if a resi-
dent of the state ‘enters into a consumer . . . loan transaction with a credi-
tor . . . in another state and the creditor . . . has advertised . . . loans in 
Indiana.’”103  If the loan falls under the Code, the lender must get an Indiana 
license and is subject to a limit on the interest rate it may charge.104  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, citing Healy, said, “The Commerce 
Clause dictates that no State may force an out-of-state merchant to seek regu-
latory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another.”105  The 
court explained that “[t]o allow Indiana to apply its law against title loans when 
its residents transact in a different state that has a different law would be arbi-
trarily to exalt the public policy of one state over that of another.”106  The court 
96. For a brief discussion of subprime loans and predatory lending see Susan Lorde Martin, The
Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 63–67 (2004). 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 98 and 101. 
98. Jane Bryant Quinn, Dragged Down by Debt: People with Shaky Credit are Getting Suckered 
by Risky Loans Against Their Paychecks, Homes?and Even Cars, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 2007, at 49. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Cash in a Flash, Inc. v. McCullough, 853 N.E.2d 533, 535–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
102. Id. at 536. 
103. Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting IND.
CODE § 24-4.5-1-201(1)(d)(2007)). 
104. Id. at 662. 
105. Id. at 665 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989)). 
106. Id. at 667–68. 
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concluded that “[a] state may not ‘take the commercial speech that is vital to 
interstate commerce and use it as a basis to allow the extraterritorial regulation 
that is destructive of such commerce.’”107  Although the Seventh Circuit did not 
invoke the “wholly” test specifically, it did in fact when it held that because the 
car-title loan was made and executed in Illinois, the Indiana law regulating it 
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine of the Commerce Clause.108
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided the payday loan case in 2015.109
The court held that Minnesota’s payday lending law did not violate the extra-
territoriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause.110  The law provided 
that “a consumer short-term loan transaction is deemed to take place in the state 
of Minnesota if the borrower is a Minnesota resident and the borrower com-
pletes the transaction, either personally or electronically, while physically lo-
cated in the state of Minnesota.”111  The difference between this law and the 
Indiana law is immediately apparent.  The Indiana law attempted to apply to 
transactions between the lender and an Indiana resident when the resident was 
in another state.112  Minnesota’s law applied only when the Minnesota resident 
was in Minnesota, clearly not “commercial activity occurring wholly outside 
the boundary of the [regulating] State.”113  The court noted that the Minnesota 
law did not control the terms of loans in other states nor did it require lenders 
to obtain Minnesota’s approval when lending to borrowers in other states.114
E. The Foie Gras Case 
Two companies that produce foie gras, one in Canada and one in New York, 
and a California restaurant that sold foie gras sought to enjoin a section in Cal-
ifornia’s Force Fed Birds statute.115  The section reads, “A product may not be 
sold in California if it is the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of 
enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size.”116  The plaintiffs argued that the 
107. Id. at 669 (quoting Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 
F.3d 484, 491 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
108. See id.
109. Swanson v. Integrity Advance, LLC, 870 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Minn. 2015). 
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 47.601, subd. 5 (2014)). 
112. Id. at 95; IND. CODE § 24-4.5-1-201(1)(d) (2007). 
113. Swanson, 870 N.W.2d at 94 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989)). 
114. Id. at 96. 
115. Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Que. v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 
2013).
116. Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (West 2012)).  During the last two 
weeks of the lives of ducks raised for foie gras, feeders hand-feed the ducks using “a tube to deliver 
the feed to the crop sac at the base of the duck’s esophagus,” to increase the size of the fattened duck 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 113 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 113 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
MARTIN-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 11:35 AM
512 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:497 
statute “controls commerce outside of California;” requires all farmers to com-
ply with California standards; and “will result in conflicting legislation.”117  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed.118
The court’s primary basis for its decision was that the plaintiffs did not pro-
vide evidence that force-feeding was the only way to produce foie gras.119  Cal-
ifornia’s law did not prevent the farmers from selling foie gras in California; it 
only prevented them from using their most profitable method for doing so, and 
“‘the dormant Commerce Clause does not . . . guarantee [p]laintiffs their pre-
ferred method of operation.’”120  In addition, the farmers could produce foie 
gras for sale in other states by any method they chose.121  Finally, with reference 
to extraterritoriality, the plaintiffs did not cite any actual competing legislation 
in other states to indicate balkanization.122  The court noted that the Supreme 
Court “has never invalidated a state or local law under the dormant Commerce 
Clause based upon mere speculation about the possibility of conflicting legis-
lation.”123
F. An Abortion Case 
The Missouri Supreme Court made an interesting maneuver in correctly 
describing unconstitutional extraterritorial conduct, applying the description to 
a clearly unconstitutional statute, but then declaring the statute constitutional.124
The Missouri legislature enacted a statute requiring parental consent for a minor 
seeking an abortion and prescribing civil penalties for violations.125  Planned 
Parenthood of Kansas challenged the constitutionality of the statute.126  Part of 
the statute stated that “[i]t shall not be a defense to a claim brought under this 
section that the abortion was performed or induced pursuant to a consent to the 
abortion given in a manner that is otherwise lawful in the state or place where 
the abortion was performed or induced.”127  The court stated that “[o]f course, 
liver. Id. at 941–42. 
117. Id. at 949. 
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th 
Cir. 2012)). 
121. Id. at 950. 
122. Id. at 951. 
123. Id. (quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 470 (9th Cir. 
2001)).
124. See Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732, 742–43 (Mo. 2007). 
125. Id. at 736 n.2. 
126. Id. at 742. 
127. Id. at 743 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 188.250.3 (2005)). 
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it is beyond Missouri’s authority to regulate conduct that occurs wholly outside 
of Missouri . . . .  Missouri simply does not have the authority to make lawful 
out-of-state conduct actionable here, for its laws do not have extraterritorial 
effect.”128  But then the court held that the statute “is valid only to the extent 
that it applies to in-state conduct and not wholly out-of-state conduct,” and, 
thus, the court was able to hold that the statute did not violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause.129  Nevertheless, the holding stopped the State of Missouri from 
applying and enforcing its law extraterritorially, protecting the policy decisions 
of bordering states. 
G. An Artist Royalty Case 
If a sale of fine art took place in California or the seller resided in California, 
California’s Resale Royalty Act required the seller to pay the artist a five per-
cent royalty.130  When Christies and Sotheby’s, auction houses, and eBay failed 
to pay the royalties, several artists or their representatives sued to recover the 
payments.131  The defendants argued that the Act violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause because it regulated sales that occurred outside of California.132
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found it easy to conclude 
that applying the royalty mandate to out-of-state sales by California residents 
violated the extraterritoriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause.133
Citing Healy, the court held that “the state statute facially regulates a commer-
cial transaction that ‘takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders’” and, 
therefore, it violates the dormant Commerce Clause.134
The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and, echoing the reluc-
tant concurrence of a Ninth Circuit judge, they said, “The question presented 
is: If a state statute does not in any way discriminate against, or impose an ex-
cessive burden on, interstate commerce, does the Commerce Clause . . . require 
the statute’s invalidation solely because it regulates commerce occurring be-
yond the borders of the state that enacted it?”135  As the preceding cases indi-
cate, so far the answer is, yes, but these plaintiffs are not alone in their opposi-
tion to the existing extraterritoriality doctrine. 
128. Id. at 742. 
129. Id. at 743, 745. 
130. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015). 
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1322–23. 
133. Id. at 1323. 
134. Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). 
135.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at § i, Sam Francis Found. v. Christie’s, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 
(9th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-280). 
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H. Internet Cases 
Finally, internet cases have suggested to some commentators that the extra-
territoriality doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause should be eliminated,136
but, in fact, these cases indicate that the doctrine works quite well.  Two cases 
involved Backpage.com, one in Washington and the other in Tennessee.137
Backpage.com is one of the largest online advertising services and, despite 
Backpage.com’s attempts to screen “adult” ads, online ads involving minors 
still appear.138  Clearly, states have an interest in protecting minors by prohib-
iting such ads.  So, Washington enacted a law prohibiting ads depicting minors 
in commercial sex acts that would occur in the State of Washington.139  Back-
page.com sued the state claiming, inter alia, that the law violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause because it regulated conduct that took place wholly outside 
the State of Washington.140  The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington agreed because “the advertisement itself may occur en-
tirely outside of the state and no act need take place in the state of Washington 
to trigger liability under the statute.  Therefore it is a statute that regulates con-
duct that occurs wholly outside of the state of Washington.”141
Tennessee enacted a similar law prohibiting ads “that would appear to a 
reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what would be a com-
mercial sex act . . . with a minor.”142  Tennessee’s law, however, did not even 
limit the prohibition to acts that would occur in Tennessee.143  Responding to a 
Backpage.com constitutional challenge, the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee held that the Tennessee statute was “a per se vio-
lation because it likely impermissibly regulates commerce wholly outside the 
state’s borders.  Nowhere in the language of the statute is there any limit on the 
statute’s geographic scope that specifies what conduct, if any, must take place 
in Tennessee.”144  The court concluded that “liability could be imposed when 
136. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal 
Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 1000 (2013); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 786–87 (2001). 
137. Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com, 
LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
138. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–67. 
139. Id. at 1265, 1268; S. 6251, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(1)(a)–(b) (Wash. 2012). 
140. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. 
141. Id.
142. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (quoting S. 2371, 107th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 3(a) 
(Tenn. 2012)). 
143. Id. at 817. 
144. Id. at 841. 
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no party has a[ny] connection to Tennessee whatsoever.”145
These two cases can encourage wrong conclusions with respect to the ex-
traterritoriality strand of the dormant Commerce Clause because they involve 
the Internet, a mode of advertising that can be anywhere and everywhere in the 
world, and a universally hated behavior, the sexual abuse of children.  But a 
closer look suggests that first, the states can regulate Internet advertising just as 
they regulate advertising in other media; they just have to be more precise in 
their language.146  And second, although policies about child sexual abuse might 
be universal among fifty states, not every state policy on other subjects would 
be agreeable to every other state.147  The section below about alcoholic bever-
age regulation illustrates this point. 
IV. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE REGULATION
Alcoholic beverage regulation is a good example of states having very dif-
ferent laws148 reflecting very different policies, and, therefore, it is a good indi-
cator for the wisdom of prohibiting states from regulating outside their own 
borders.  Alcoholic beverage use and regulation in the United States has a his-
tory of being problematic and peculiar.  On the one hand, from the days of the 
earliest settlers through the nineteenth century, Americans were very heavy 
wine, beer, and rum drinkers.149  On the other, over three generations starting 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the temperance movement was successful in get-
ting states to enact prohibition statutes150 and to ratify the Eighteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution prohibiting “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors” within the United States and their importation into or ex-
portation from the United States.151
The ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution152 re-
145. Id. at 842. 
146. See id. at 842–43. 
147. See Backpage.com LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1285 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
148. See generally RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE
REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880–1920 20 (1995). 
149. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 7–8, 25–26 (2010); 
IAN R. TYRRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO PROHIBITION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA,
1800–1860 16–24 (1979).
150. By 1855 thirteen of thirty-one states had prohibition statutes.  NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER
US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 36 (1976); HAMM, supra note 148, 
at 20–21; W.J. Rorabaugh, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 289 
(1996).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (ratified in 1919 and in effect from 1920 until 1933). 
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
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pealed the Eighteenth Amendment putting an end to Prohibition, but the lan-
guage, the meaning, and the intent of Section Two of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment remains ambiguous and continues to give rise to litigation in the twenty-
first century.153  Section Two states: “The transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein 
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”154
The cases that consider this language giving states the power to regulate alco-
holic beverages often are about how this mandate interacts with other federal 
interests and constitutional requirements.155
For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment does not overcome Fourteenth 
Amendment due process requirements.156  In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land, the Court held that Rhode Island’s ban on price advertising for liquor vi-
olated the First Amendment’s free speech protection, which does not give way 
to states’ Twenty-First Amendment power.157  Similarly, the Twenty-First 
Amendment does not overcome the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
requirements.158  The most recent well-publicized confrontation between states’ 
power to regulate alcoholic beverages and the U.S. Constitution pitted the 
Twenty-First Amendment against the dormant Commerce Clause in cases in-
volving the direct shipment of wine to out-of-state consumers.159
In Granholm v. Heald, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether state 
laws in Michigan and New York that allowed in-state wineries to ship wine 
directly to consumers in the state, but prohibited out-of-state wineries from do-
ing likewise (either literally or by imposing extra economic requirements), were 
unconstitutional.160  The Court decided that the states’ differential treatment 
was explicit discrimination against interstate commerce and fell under “a virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity.”161  The Court concluded that the Twenty-First 
153. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 n.10 
(1980) (noting records of state conventions do not indicate consensus on meaning of Section Two). 
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
155. See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1964); 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
484, 489 (1996). 
156. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436. 
157. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 489. 
158. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204–05 (1976) (holding that Oklahoma’s statute prohibiting 
sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty-one and females under eighteen was unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory and not saved by Twenty-First Amendment). 
159. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005). 
160. Id. at 465–66. 
161. Id. at 466, 476 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
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Amendment does not overcome the anti-discrimination requirements of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.162  It is not a stretch to assume that the Twenty-
First Amendment does not overcome the extraterritoriality requirements of the 
dormant Commerce Clause either. 
V. THE STRANGE EMPIRE WINE CASE AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
After Granholm v. Heald, almost all states changed their laws so that out-
of-state wineries would be allowed to ship wine directly to consumers, all with 
a variety of limitations including permit, tax, and reciprocity requirements and 
maximum amounts.163  Only six states remain that do not allow out-of-state 
wineries to direct-ship to consumers.164  The six stay within the constitutional 
boundaries set by Granholm by not allowing in-state wineries to ship directly 
to consumers either.165  Although some argue otherwise,166 so far Granholm
does not generally apply to wine retailers.167  Only fourteen states allow out-of-
state wine retailers to ship directly to consumers.168  It is that fact that has given 
162. Id. at 487–88 (relying on Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984), for 
foreclosing “any contention that § 2 of the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment immunizes discriminatory di-
rect-shipment laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny”). 
163. Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries, WINE INSTITUTE, http://www.wineinsti-
tute.org/files/direct_shipping_laws_map.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6VZ-W6AG] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017).
164. Id. (Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah). 
165. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 467. 
166. Eric Asimov, A Befuddlement of Liquor Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2008), at F7, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/dining/30pour.html [https://perma.cc/T97F-N25R] (noting that 
Specialty Wine Retailers Association, a trade group, asserts that Granholm applies to retailers as well 
as to wineries). 
167. See, e.g., Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that the limited rights Texas gives its in-state retailers to make deliveries do not discriminate against 
out-of-state retailers and do not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 
571 F.3d 185, 186, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that New York subjects both in-state and out-of-
state liquor retailers to its three-tier system, a system upheld by U.S. Supreme Court, and, therefore, 
prohibiting out-of-state retailers from shipping directly to consumers does not violate dormant Com-
merce Clause). But see Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008).  
The federal district court in Michigan said although the Supreme Court approved the three-tier system, 
it did not approve a system that discriminates against out-of-staters. Id. at 1039.  The court held that 
the Twenty-First Amendment did not save rules that discriminated against out-of-state wine retailers. 
Id.  The court also held that allowing out-of-state retailers to comply with Michigan law by establishing 
a location in Michigan was discriminatory because the “prohibitive” expense of opening physical stores 
in multiple states gave a clear advantage to in-state retailers.  Id. at 1040.  Thus, the court held the 
Michigan laws violated the dormant Commerce Clause.  Id.
168. Retail-to-Consumer Direct Wine Shipping Guide, SHIPCOMPLIANT, http://www.shipcom-
pliant.com/media/40066/retail_to_consumer_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYC9-75R4] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017) (Alaska, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, and D.C.). 
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rise to the Empire Wine case.169
Empire Wine & Spirits LLC, (Empire) located in and licensed by the State 
of New York, uses the Internet to sell and deliver wine to consumers in and 
outside of New York.170  This is the strange part: New York is one of thirty-six 
states that prohibits retailers from shipping any alcoholic beverages into New 
York to anyone who does not have a license to sell them, that is, to consum-
ers;171 however, New York does not have a law that prohibits anyone in New 
York from shipping wine or other alcoholic beverages to anyone in another 
state.172  Empire admitted that it shipped wine to retail customers in sixteen 
other states.173  All but two of them prohibit out-of-state retailers from shipping 
wine directly to in-state consumers, and one of the two would not permit ship-
ping from New York State because it is a reciprocity state.174  So, the New York 
State Liquor Authority (NYSLA) threatened to revoke Empire’s license for 
“improper conduct.”175  It is unclear what New York’s interest is in enforcing 
laws of other states against a New York business when the business did not 
violate any New York laws. 
In response, Empire brought an action to enjoin the NYSLA from proceed-
ing with the license revocation hearing on the grounds that the NYSLA’s asser-
tion of authority over wine shipments to another state violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.176  The New York Supreme Court dismissed the case with-
out prejudice requiring Empire first to exhaust its administrative remedies.177
169. Empire Wine & Spirits LLC v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 988 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2014). 
170. Verified Petition & Complaint at 4, Empire Wine & Spirits LLC v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
988 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). 
171. N.Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 102(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2016). 
172. Id.
173. Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition and Complaint at 4, Empire Wine & 
Spirits LLC v.  N.Y. State Liquor Auth., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 22, 2014). 
174.  John Trinidad, Lex Vini—21st Amendment Litigation: NY Wine Retailer Sues NYSLA,
DICKENSON PEATMAN & FOGARTY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.dpf-law.com/blogs/lex-vini/empire-
wine-nysla-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/FK5X-M5NB]. See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2 
(West 2014); Retail-to-Consumer Direct Wine Shipping Guide, supra note 168. 
175. N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. tit. 9, § 53.1(n) (2011). 
176. Verified Petition & Complaint at 6, Empire Wine & Spirits LLC v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
988 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). Empire also asserted that the regulation allowing the NYSLA 
to revoke a license for “improper conduct” was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 3.  A discussion of 
vagueness is beyond the scope of this article.  N.Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 79-c 
(West 2005). 
177. Yoni Bashan, Interstate Shipping Flap Rattles N.Y. Wine Retailers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 
2014, at A21; Casey Seiler, Empire Wine’s Lawsuit Against SLA is Dismissed, TIMES UNION CAPITOL
CONFIDENTIAL (Nov. 20, 2014), http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/224803/empire-wines-
lawsuit-against-SLA-is-dismissed [https://perma.cc/C2QR-H3CF]; Lauren Halligan, Wine Industry 
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There is no indication that any of the states to which Empire shipped wine 
took any action against Empire,178 or any other out-of-state retail wine ship-
per.179  In fact, California, which allows out-of-state retail wine shipping into 
California only by retailers in states that allow reciprocal shipping privileges,180
has stipulated in a court proceeding that its Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control has never taken any enforcement action against any retail licensees in 
other states that have sold and shipped wine directly to California adults.181  The 
Department explained that it devotes its limited resources to higher priorities 
that directly impact Californians’ health and safety.182
If California’s regulatory agency deems the violation of its rule to be of too 
little consequence to act on, how does it serve New York’s interest to deem the 
behavior “improper conduct”183 and use it to severely penalize a New York 
business?  If other states do not see it as in their interest to prosecute Empire 
for violating their laws, it would seem to be an unconstitutional extraterritorial 
dormant Commerce Clause violation for the NYSLA to do so.  Many court 
opinions suggest as much.184  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has noted that 
a state lacks the authority to regulate a person’s activities in another state be-
cause “‘[t]he general rule, unquestionably, is that the laws of a state have no 
extraterritorial effect.’ . . .  Although limited exceptions to this general rule 
might exist, explicitly prohibiting ‘persons’ from engaging in activities outside 
the state does not fall within one of those exceptions.”185  The Supreme Court 
Keeping Eye on Empire Wine Dispute, SARATOGIAN (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.saratogian.com/arti-
cle/ST/20150223/NEWS/150229926 [https://perma.cc/QSY3-KPVJ].
178. Robert Taylor, New York State Cracks Down on Its Top Wine Merchants, WINE SPECTATOR
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/50661 (“Empire Wine 
owner . . . said that [he] had never received a complaint or cease-and-desist order from any of the states 
to which [he] had shipped wine.”); Tom Wark, New Cause to “Wine” about New York Business Cli-
mate, N.Y. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/04/10/new-cause-to-wine-about-new-york-
business-climate/ [https://perma.cc/SFL4-R94T] (noting that Empire has not been charged with or con-
victed of any wrongdoing in any state to which it has shipped wine, nor had any state investigated 
Empire until asked for help by New York). 
179. Bashan, supra note 177, at A25 (mentioning that legal experts say states are generally lax 
about enforcing out-of-state wine shipping laws). 
180. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2 (West 2014). 
181. Stipulation, Agreement, and Order at 2, Knightsbridge Wine Shoppe, Ltd. v. Jolly, No. 5:06-
cv-02890-JF (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 15, 2006). 
182. Id. at 2–3. 
183. Verified Petition & Complaint at 3, Empire Wine & Spirits LLC v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
988 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). 
184. See Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 819 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 2012); 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006), reh’g denied; Oregon v. Meyer, 
53 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
185. Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., Inc., 819 N.W.2d at 252–53 (quoting State v. Mueller, 171 N.W.2d 
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of Texas has argued similarly against states attempting to govern beyond their 
borders.186  The Court of Appeals in Oregon held that Oregon officers cannot 
issue traffic violations in a state outside of Oregon unless that state authorized 
such an action.187
As far as can be determined, no state has asked New York to enforce its 
alcoholic beverage retail shipping laws.  Without such a request, what would 
New York’s interest be in enforcing another state’s shipping law when the other 
state is not interested enough to enforce it itself?  New York is burdening inter-
state commerce and acting impermissibly extraterritorially by undertaking a 
procedure to revoke Empire’s license based on Empire’s actions in other states. 
In response to this case, the New York Assembly and Senate both passed 
bills amending New York’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (NYABCL) to 
eliminate the NYSLA’s authority to penalize licensees based on possible vio-
lations of other states’ laws unless the conduct violates a specific provision of 
NYABCL or the licensee’s conduct resulted in a criminal conviction in another 
state.188  The governor vetoed the bill explaining it would send “a clear signal 
that New York is a haven for entities intent on breaking other states’ laws.”189
He might have added, even those which other states do not consider important 
enough to enforce themselves. 
State alcoholic beverage laws make a good case for the importance of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine of the Commerce Clause because the laws are so var-
ied across states.190  Different states have made different judgments about what 
is and is not important in the regulation of alcoholic beverages.  One state 
should not be able to regulate beyond its borders because its perception of ap-
propriate regulation and enforcement could be completely different from that 
of its neighbors. 
414, 416 (Wis. 1969)). 
186. Coca-Cola, 218 S.W.3d at 680–81. 
187. Meyer, 53 P.3d at 945–46. 
188. 2015 N.Y. SESS. LAWS S.4446, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?term=2015&bn=S04446
[https://perma.cc/LCD4-CFHJ]; 2015 N.Y. SESS. LAWS A.5920, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?de-
fault_fld=&bn=A05920&term=2015&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y
[https://perma.cc/R4KC-L565].
189. David Lombardo (@poozer87), Letter from New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to the New 
York Assembly, TWITTER (Dec. 12, 2015, 5:26 AM), https://twitter.com/poozer87/sta-
tus/675668081700691969/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/E4S2-UEUT] (citing N.Y. Executive Chamber, 
Opinion Letter on Veto to Assembly Bill 5920 (Dec. 11, 2015)). 
190. See supra notes 164 and 171 and accompanying text. 
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VI. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN STATE LAW
The extraterritoriality doctrine exists not only in Commerce Clause consti-
tutional jurisprudence but also in state common law.191  For example, an Oregon 
resident signed an independent contractor agreement with a North Carolina 
company in North Carolina but did all his work for the company outside of 
North Carolina.192  The worker then sued the company for violating the North 
Carolina Wage and Hour Act.193  The North Carolina appellate court held that 
the Act does not provide a cause of action for someone who neither lived nor 
worked in North Carolina because states have no extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
and according to the North Carolina Supreme Court “[t]he presumption is al-
ways against any intention to attempt giving to the act an extraterritorial oper-
ation and effect.”194  In 1894, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that “[i]t 
is a general principle of universal accepta[nce] that one state . . . cannot enforce 
the penal or criminal laws of another, or punish crimes or offenses committed 
in and against another state or sovereignty.”195
The following year, 1895, the New York Court of Appeals, in refusing to 
enforce a Kansas statute, referred to “a principle of universal application, rec-
ognized in all civilized states, that the statutes of [one] state have . . . no force 
or effect in another.”196  In 1897, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky noted that 
“[t]he statute of another state has, of course, no extraterritorial force.”197
In the twenty-first century, courts continue to cite the same principle.  In 
2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opined that “California 
courts have long recognized a presumption against the extraterritorial applica-
tion of state law,” and therefore, “California statutory remedies are not availa-
ble ‘for injuries suffered by non-California residents, caused by conduct occur-
ring outside of California’s borders, by defendants whose headquarters and 
principal places of operations are outside of California.’”198  The court ex-
plained that in the case at hand, the plaintiff was a Kansas corporation with its 
191. Crippen v. Laighton, 44 A. 538, 541 (N.H. 1899) (“It is universally agreed that the laws of 
a state have, ex proprio vigore [of its own force], no extraterritorial force; that is to say, no state ‘can 
by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind person not resident 
therein.’”).
192. Sawyer v. Mkt. Am., Inc., 661 S.E.2d 750, 751–52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
193. Id. at 752. 
194. Id. at 754 (quoting McCullough v. Scott, 109 S.E. 789, 796 (N.C. 1921)). 
195. State v. Hall, 19 S.E. 602, 602 (N.C. 1894). 
196. Marshall v. Sherman, 42 N.E. 419, 423 (N.Y. 1895). 
197. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Whitlow’s Adm’r, 43 S.W. 711, 713 (Ky. 1897). 
198. Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Norwest 
Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 
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principal place of business in Colorado.199  The plaintiff did not allege any in-
jury or communication with the defendant in California or any conduct by the 
defendant in California.200  Therefore, California law could not control the 
transactions between them.201
VII. OPPOSITION TO THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE IN THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE
In spite of its long-standing acceptance as a way of organizing regulation, 
the extraterritorial doctrine has been the subject of much criticism in recent 
years.202  An impetus for the criticism is the increasing overlap of federal and 
state jurisdiction in matters having interstate implications.203  With the broad 
interpretation of interstate commerce in the 1960s and 1970s enabling the fed-
eral government to regulate commerce that was seemingly intrastate,204 and 
states regulating commerce that has great interstate impact,205 some argue that 
the boundary between territorial and extraterritorial regulation has blurred too 
much to make the doctrine workable.206  Some argue that the only use for the 
dormant Commerce Clause now is to prevent in-state favoritism, and the extra-
territoriality strand of Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be eliminated.207
254 P.3d 237, 248 (Cal. 2011). 
199. Anschutz Corp., 690 F.3d at 111. 
200. Id.
201. Id. at 112. 
202. Denning, supra note 136, at 980–81. 
203. Recent Cases, Dormant Commerce Clause—Extraterritoriality Doctrine—Sixth Circuit In-
validates Michigan Statute Requiring Bottle Manufacturers to Use Unique Mark on All Bottles Sold 
Within Michigan—American Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2435, 2438–39 (2013) [hereinafter Recent Cases].
204. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146–47, 147 n.1 (1971) (applying federal 
law to local loan shark because of money flowing to and from interstate criminal enterprise); Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (applying federal law to local restaurant because of pur-
chase of foodstuffs from out of state). 
205. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 180 (1950) (state 
fixing price of gas drilled and purchased within state but mostly shipped and used out of state). 
206. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., 
concurring).
207. Id.; Sam Francis Found. v. Christie’s, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1332–34 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rein-
hardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that in extraterritoriality cases, the Su-
preme Court wrongly ignores primary dormant Commerce Clause issue of protectionism and recom-
mending that Supreme Court should reconsider its per se extraterritoriality rule); Recent Cases, supra 
note 203, at 2438. 
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Some assert that the extraterritoriality doctrine is already dead.208
One specific problem that commentators mention is that extraterritoriality 
does not fit well within accepted Commerce Clause notions of discrimination 
so courts get confused.209  Courts will mistakenly apply the test for statutes that 
discriminate against out-of-staters to statutes regulating extraterritorially.210
That argument is not very persuasive.  The extraterritoriality doctrine is an im-
portant element in preserving the federal government’s right and responsibility 
to regulate interstate commerce without infringement by the states.  Although 
in the modern economy, it would be impossible for states to regulate without 
having some effect on interstate commerce, the dormant Commerce Clause 
serves the important purpose of putting limits on that regulation.  The extrater-
ritoriality principle also keeps states from enacting and enforcing regulations 
that would promote hostility when there are differences of opinion among them 
about appropriate policies to pursue, the untoward notion of balkanization.211
One way the limiting purpose is served is the better-known principle of pro-
hibiting a state from discriminating against out-of-staters in economic regula-
tion.  Applying this principle through the use of the Pike balancing test has been 
well-accepted.212  The doctrine of extraterritoriality has become a Commerce 
Clause step-child merely because it is not specifically about discrimination but 
more generally about not putting an undue burden on interstate commerce and 
not contributing to legislative balkanization, and it does not have a neatly 
named test for deciding when it does or does not apply.213  Instead, it has a 
simpler method for application: deciding whether the state regulation at issue 
regulates “wholly outside” the state.214  That seems like an easy test as long as 
a court resists confusing the issue with the Pike balancing test, which does not 
apply.  “Wholly” makes the statute per se impermissible; less than “wholly” 
and the statute stands.215  Cases described above suggest that the distinction is 
fairly easy to discern.216  One commentator has opined that an appropriate test 
208. Denning, supra note 136, at 979–80; Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next 
Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 421 (2013) (asserting that extraterri-
toriality notion “is an abandoned nineteenth-century relic”). 
209. Felmly, supra note 2, at 492. 
210. Id. at 492–93 (citing Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 
1995)).
211. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 916 (D. Minn. 2014). 
212. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
213. See generally supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
214. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). 
215. Id. at 643. 
216. See discussion supra Section III. 
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for extraterritorial invalidity is if a state regulation “inescapably” regulates be-
yond the state’s borders as a practical matter.217  It is unclear why “inescapably” 
is an improvement over “wholly,” which has been generally accepted and un-
derstood by courts. 
That judges are not necessarily careful in applying tests and principles, as 
suggested by some commentators,218 does not indict the tests and principles.  In 
fact, and putting to lie assertions that courts do not understand extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence, the Sixth Circuit, citing Baldwin and Healy, explained that in 
addition to protectionist regulations, a second category that is invalid under the 
dormant Commerce Clause includes regulations that control commerce wholly 
outside the borders of the regulating state.219  “A state, in other words, cannot 
‘project its legislation’ into another state,” the court said.220  Then the court 
cited the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits for recognizing the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant Com-
merce Clause as being a distinct per se violation not subject to the Pike test.221
This recitation indicates that courts are not having unusual difficulty applying 
extraterritoriality principles. 
Unfortunately, some commentators have encouraged the misapplication of 
the Pike test by arguing that only extraterritorial regulations that discriminate 
against out-of-staters are unconstitutional; extraterritorial regulation that does 
not prefer in-staters to out-of-staters should be subjected to balancing and held 
constitutional if the state benefits outweigh the burden on interstate com-
merce.222  An asserted reason for this position is that there are legitimate state 
interests that occur beyond a state’s borders.223  What is missing from this anal-
ysis is the requirement for a finding of unconstitutional extraterritoriality, indi-
cated in the cases above, that states are regulating wholly outside their borders.
That is a high standard, and meeting it is an indication that a state is attempting 
to regulate beyond the scope of its legitimate interest.  In the Sam Francis case, 
for example, the Ninth Circuit hypothesized that a California resident with a 
217. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s Progressive 
Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,
39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 425 (2015). 
218. Katherine Florey, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered: A Reply, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2010). 
219. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 645 (6th Cir. 2010). 
220. Id.
221. Id. at 645–46. 
222. Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Con-
siderations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 727–28, 730 (2007). 
223. Id. at 730. 
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part-time New York apartment bought a sculpture in New York from a North 
Dakota artist to furnish her New York apartment and then sold the sculpture to 
a friend in New York.224  If the sculpture, the artist, the buyer, and the location 
of the transaction have absolutely no connection to California, why should Cal-
ifornia’s decision to make the seller pay royalties to the North Dakota artist 
overcome New York’s decision or North Dakota’s decision not to require such 
a payment?  Perhaps other states view a required “tax” on art to be an undesir-
able impediment to commerce in art objects, a more important concern than 
providing ongoing royalties for artists beyond the first sale of their works. 
Another cited problem is the perception that there is not only a dormant 
Commerce Clause extraterritoriality doctrine, but also a Due Process extrater-
ritoriality doctrine.225  It is unclear why this is a problem at all when the two 
doctrines apply in different situations and have different purposes.  Unlike the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the purpose of which is preventing states from put-
ting undue burdens on interstate commerce,226 extraterritoriality in a Due Pro-
cess context has as its purpose protecting individuals without sufficient state 
contacts from being unreasonably subjected to its laws.227  As others have con-
cluded, these two uses of extraterritoriality are not necessarily at odds with each 
other, but merely different and may complement each other.228
Finally, there is the problem of a dysfunctional Congress.  Some of the 
problems addressed in cases described above, like advertising sex acts involv-
ing minors or encouraging clean energy, would be better resolved with national 
regulation.  In 1899, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said, “If it is an evil 
that the laws . . . of one state cannot be directly enforced in another, the mischief 
can be easily cured by congress.”229  But if Congress is not acting, then it is not 
surprising that states attempt to do so and, in so doing, sometimes go beyond 
their geographic authority.  Those facts do not indicate a problem with consti-
tutional requirements; they indicate a problem with the current political will of 
the people and their political parties.  Political will comes and goes, flows and 
ebbs; that should not be the case with constitutional principles. 
224. Sam Francis Found. v. Christie’s, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015). 
225. Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterri-
toriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1065–66 (2009). 
226. Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1133, 1138 (2010); Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2010). 
227. Rosen, supra note 226, at 1137–38; Midwest Title Loans, 593 F.3d at 668. 
228. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 380 (6th Cir. 2013); Midwest Title Loans,
593 F.3d at 668. 
229. Crippen v. Laighton, 44 A. 538, 541 (N.H. 1899). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The demise of the dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine 
has been greatly exaggerated.  The cases above indicate that states, unsurpris-
ingly, sometimes attempt to regulate beyond their borders.  When those disad-
vantaged by the extraterritorial regulation have sought to have courts declare 
the regulation unconstitutional, courts have routinely relied on several prece-
dential U.S. Supreme Court cases to make principled decisions on whether the 
state is regulating wholly outside its borders.  If so, then the regulation is im-
permissibly extraterritorial.  Merely because a state has a good purpose and one 
it would like its sister states to embrace as well, does not suggest that it should 
be able to impose its will on other states whose voters may have different pri-
orities.  Invalid extraterritoriality is a bedrock of a federalist system that seems 
unnecessary only when the federal part of that system is underperforming. 
